

# INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO FRICTIONS

DU, FONTANA, JAKUBIK, KOIJEN, SHIN


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- This paper: study the **intersection of ICPFs + banks and fixed income markets**
  - ▶ Fixed income markets matter for the real economy (e.g., Gilchrist & Zakrajsek, 2012)
  - ▶ ICPFs matter for bond yields (e.g., Greenwood & Vissing Jorgensen, 2018; Jansen 2023)
  - ▶ Role for ICPF sector for the development of corporate bond markets (Scharfstein, 2018)
- Main contribution: provide **new stylized facts** using novel firm-level holdings data
  - ▶ Solvency II data on ICPFs from the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority
  - ▶ Confidential version of the BIS Locational Banking Statistics


# BOND SUPPLY AND ICPF MARKET SIZE



■ Fact 1: **Size of ICPF sector + banks > government bond supply**

► ICPF and banks like government bonds b/c (unlike corporate bonds) they carry 0 risk weights

# BOND SUPPLY AND ICPF MARKET SIZE



	(1) Ratio Corp/FI	(2) Ratio Corp/FI
Log(ICPF/GDP)	0.219*** (0.0290)	0.103** (0.0470)
Log(Per Capita GDP)		0.138*** (0.0380)
Log(Bank Securities/GDP)		
Log(Bank Assets/GDP)		
Constant	0.556*** (0.0346)	-1.794** (0.650)
Observations	28	28
R-squared	0.588	0.658

## ■ Fact 1: **Size of ICPF sector + banks > government bond supply**

- ICPF and banks like government bonds b/c (unlike corporate bonds) they carry 0 risk weights

## ■ Fact 2: **Larger ICPF sector correlates with larger corporate bond market**

- Strong demand for fixed income assets  $\Rightarrow$  lower yields  $\Rightarrow$  more issuance (supply is elastic) <sup>2 / 10</sup>

# INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO FRICTIONS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Overall Port.	Home Port.	Foreign Port.	Domestic Firm	Foreign Firm
(A) Insurers					
Corp/FI Outstanding	0.485*** (0.0907)	0.769*** (0.0977)	0.239** (0.0986)	0.364*** (0.106)	0.496*** (0.0842)
Constant	0.263*** (0.0461)	0.112** (0.0472)	0.449*** (0.0483)	0.358*** (0.0637)	0.249*** (0.0418)
Observations	29	29	29	29	29
R-squared	0.488	0.631	0.202	0.277	0.590

- Fact 3: **Domestic projection bias:** Home country supply shapes FI portfolio abroad
  - ▶ Null: Investors offset low domestic government bond supply by investing more elsewhere
  - ▶ The opposite is the case! Higher share of corp bonds in foreign FI portfolio! (column 3)

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- Fact 4: **Going native bias:** Local branches of foreign firms look like domestic firms
  - ▶ The corporate bond allocations of Italian firms and Italian branches of French firms similarly depend on Italian government bond supply

## COMMENT 1: MATURITY SEGMENTS

- ICPF and banks typically operate in specific maturity segments
  - ▶ ICPF: very long maturity, banks (relatively) shorter maturity
- What matters is not the overall supply of domestic government bonds, but the **supply in the right maturity segment**
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
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- Potential to sharpen the empirics
  - ▶ There is a larger *long-maturity* corporate bond market (relative to shorter maturities) in countries with larger ICPF sector
  - ▶ What matters for international portfolio frictions is the supply of *long-term* government bonds




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- Limits alternative explanations (needs to explain both the overall fact and why it lines up with maturity)

## COMMENT 2A: HOME REGION BIAS




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- (Some) financial institutions operate in countries belonging to the *same region*
  - ▶ Defined geographically (Nordic, EE)
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- Countries in same region *cluster* on share of corporate bonds relative to total supply
- **Home region bias** as unified explanation
  - ▶ *Domestic projection* as supply in home & foreign country within region similar
  - ▶ *Going native bias* because pool of firms with region is homogeneous

## COMMENT 2B: HOME REGION BIAS

- Do *domestic projection* & *going native bias* follow mechanically from *home region bias*?

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- Don't look at Svenska Handelsbanken, but look at Raiffeisen
  - ▶ Handelsbanken's home country is Sweden and otherwise it operates in the same region of similar countries  $\Rightarrow$  there is **no interesting variation** in corporate bond supply to exploit
  - ▶ Raiffeisen's home country is Austria, but it's business is largely Eastern Europe
    - ★ **Not** the same region as Austria (east versus west of the Iron Curtain)
    - ★ There is **variation** in corporate bond supply between Austria and Eastern Europe
    - ★ Does the supply of bonds in Austria drive Raiffeisen's portfolio in Eastern Europe?

## COMMENT 2C: HOME REGION BIAS

- More formally: separate the share of corporate bonds in the foreign fixed income portfolio into *foreign country - home region* and *foreign country - foreign region*
  - ▶ *Home region bias*: Corporate portfolio share in home region depends on home country supply, but portfolio share in foreign regions does not
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- Standard errors in cross-country regressions: correlated errors within **regional clusters**
  - ▶ Even if there are only 29 observations in total...

## COMMENT 3: MAKE THEORY & POLICY IMPLICATIONS CONCRETE

- 1 The paper has a concrete model (following Koijen and Yogo, 2023)
  - ▶ Large ICPF sector  $\Rightarrow$  demand for corporate bonds high  $\Rightarrow$  more issuance
  - ▶ But doesn't feature *domestic projection bias* and *going native bias*
  - ▶ Potential microfoundations are discussed loosely (internal risk, risk shifting, skill, inertia, local regulators)
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- 2 **Capital market deepening and integration across Europe impacted from international portfolio frictions, reducing substitutability across countries**
  - ▶ Average portfolio tilts  $\neq$  how investors substitute across countries
  - ▶ Missing capital market integration might be the driver of low substitutability
  - ▶ What precisely is the problem here? Don't just say findings have 'important implications.'  
**Spell it out. Quantify it.**

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- 3 Transmission of Monetary Policy differs across countries because of varying bond supplies
  - ▶ Maybe. But again, **be concrete.**

## COMMENT 4: FRICTIONS?

### Why is the paper titled “International Portfolio Frictions”?

- To understand if it's frictions, you need to understand the precise mechanism...
  - ▶ ... But ultimately, that's not what the paper does (nor claims to do)
- Documenting “puzzles” or “biases” in the international portfolios of ICPFs and banks describes the paper better
  - ▶ The two frictions are *domestic projection bias* and *going native bias*

# CONCLUSION

- Amazing paper! Great data!
- A lot of new stylized facts on sector demands & bond supply + new international portfolio biases (*domestic projection bias* + *going native bias*)
- Beyond stylized facts, need to better understand mechanism (e.g., home region bias)...
- ... Which is also needed to flesh out policy implications